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Chapter 9
Long-Term Potentiation: One Kind or Many?
Jacqueline A. Sullivan
Abstract Do neurobiologists aim to discover natural kinds? I address this question 
in this chapter via a critical analysis of classification practices operative across the 
43-year history of research on long-term potentiation (LTP). I suggest that this 
43-year history supports the idea that the structure of scientific practice surrounding 
LTP research has remained an obstacle to the discovery of natural kinds  as 
 philosophers of science have traditionally conceived them.
9.1  Introduction
A unique aspect of being trained by Peter Machamer is the importance he places on 
understanding scientific practices, providing descriptively accurate accounts of 
those practices and teasing out the interesting philosophical implications. He also 
encourages his students to gain hands-on experience in those areas of science of 
interest to them. My experience working in a neurobiology laboratory as a graduate 
student in combination with his mentoring have been invaluable to my thinking on 
a host of philosophical issues, including the one I take up in this chapter: the rela-
tionship between neurobiological kinds and scientific practice.
To provide some relevant background, in a paper in 2009, I described an observa-
tion I made while undertaking research in a neurobiological laboratory. I worked in 
the field of synaptic plasticity, the ability of synapses to undergo changes in response 
to patterns of electrical activity, which is thought to underlie learning and memory. 
I noticed that neuroscience affords investigators the freedom to produce forms of 
synaptic plasticity in a plurality of different ways, using different patterns of affer-
ent stimulation. Given that different stimulation protocols could potentially recruit 
different mechanisms, it was an open question whether phenomena produced in 
different laboratories using  different protocols were the same phenomenon or dif-
ferent phenomena.
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One of the examples I used in my paper to illustrate the “multiplicity of experi-
mental protocols” was long-term potentiation (LTP), which is generally defined as 
an activity-dependent increase in the strength of a synapse. I restricted my focus to 
then contemporary investigations of the role of a single protein kinase cascade in 
LTP, the extracellular-signal regulated kinase (ERK), and provided evidence that in 
response to different LTP induction protocols (e.g., theta-burst, high-frequency 
stimulation), all which investigators claimed could be used to successfully induce 
LTP, the kinase responded differently. I used this as a basis to suggest that it was a 
live possibility that different investigators who used different LTP induction proto-
cols to investigate the mechanisms of LTP were actually investigating different phe-
nomena produced by different mechanisms rather than the same phenomenon 
produced by the same or different mechanisms. In other words, given the structure 
of experimental practice, it was unclear if LTP was one kind or many kinds.
Some questions that I did not ask in the 2009 paper, however, were: (1) Do LTP 
researchers themselves take different instances of LTP to be the same kind of phe-
nomenon or different phenomena? (2) Is there consensus in the field about how to 
“lump” or “split” the phenomena? (3) Is the multiplicity of experimental protocols 
an obstacle to the discovery of kinds that track actual divisions in the causal struc-
ture of the world (i.e., so-called “natural kinds”)?
In this chapter, I engage in an historical analysis of LTP in order to provide at 
least some preliminary answers to these questions. I begin in Sect. 9.2 with an anal-
ysis of two strategies that have been put forward in the philosophical literature on 
mechanisms for revising scientific taxonomies, what I will refer to simply as (a) the 
“natural kinds strategy” (Craver 2002) and (b) the “conventional kinds” strategy 
(Craver 2009). In Sect. 9.3, I use these strategies in combination with some concep-
tual tools for thinking about LTP experiments in order to answer the aforementioned 
questions.
9.2  Two Competing Constraints on Scientific Taxonomies
It is widely accepted that a primary aim of neuroscience is to describe the mecha-
nisms that produce phenomena of interest (e.g., Bechtel 2008; Machamer et  al. 
2000; Craver 2007). Implicit in this account of mechanistic explanation is a charac-
terization of scientific progress in which kinds of phenomena and the mechanisms 
productive of those phenomena change over time. The basic idea is that sciences 
like neuroscience begin by characterizing phenomena and organizing them into 
groups on the basis of detectable surface features. As empirical inquiry yields data 
concerning the mechanisms that produce these phenomena, revisions are made with 
the aim of accommodating that taxonomy to the mechanistic structure of the world. 
This process is iterative; as more is found out about the mechanisms underlying 
phenomena of interest, further revisions to the taxonomy are possible (e.g., Bechtel 
2008; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Craver 2007, 2009). This view is consistent 
with the idea that sciences like neuroscience have realist aims; they aim to provide 
explanations of phenomena that reflect “how actually” those phenomena are 
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produced in the natural world. In doing so, they approximate towards scientific tax-
onomies that reflect real divisions of kinds that correspond to the mechanistic struc-
ture of the world (See Craver 2006).
Areas of science that seek to accommodate their taxonomies of kinds to the 
mechanistic structure of the world may be described as being engaged in a search 
for so- called “natural kinds” (Craver 2002, 2007, 2009). In an early paper, Carl 
Craver (2002), noted that cognitive neuroscientists seemed to uphold a sufficient 
criterion for natural kindhood that he dubbed the “No Dissociable Realization 
(NDR)” condition.1 On this condition, “instances of a natural kind have one and 
only one realizer” and “if there are two distinct realizers for a putative instance of a 
kind, there are really two kinds, one for each realizer” (Craver 2002, 962). The 
example that Craver provides to illustrate how this condition operates in practice is 
memory research. Although neuroscientists originally believed that memory was a 
single kind of phenomenon, findings from lesion studies and research on subjects 
with selective brain damage revealed that declarative memory depends on different 
brain structures than procedural memory. In light of these findings, the category of 
memory was split into two groups of phenomena. Further findings about memory 
mechanisms have prompted further subdivisions in the taxonomy of memory (e.g., 
Kandel and Squire 2008; Sweatt 2009). These and other examples of taxonomic 
practices in action (e.g., Bechtel 2008) lend support to the idea that cognitive neu-
roscientists implement the NDR condition when revising the taxonomy of kinds of 
memory. Thus, in instances where empirical inquiry yields findings that indicate 
that the current taxonomy of neurobiological kinds does not correspond to neural 
architecture, the taxonomy is revised so as to ensure such correspondence.
Craver (2009), however, offers an alternative account of the kinds of criteria that 
inform “taxonomic revisions” in neuroscience that is also compatible with mecha-
nistic accounts of neuroscientific explanation. Whereas the NDR condition is con-
sistent with the idea that neuroscientists treat the world as “an objective arbiter 
among competing taxonomies of kinds” (e.g., of memory) and that their explana-
tory interests play no role in shaping the kinds they ultimately discover, if we con-
sider the situation from another perspective, claims Craver, we become privy to the 
fact that investigators themselves, rather than the world, determine when two kinds 
of phenomena or two kinds of mechanisms are different or the same. Consider again 
the declarative and procedural memory case. Empirical findings across animal and 
human studies indicate that declarative memory depends on structures in the medial 
temporal lobe and procedural memory depends on the basal ganglia. However, the 
first thing to notice is that the kinds of findings supporting this division emanate 
from different kinds of brains—animal and human brains—that differ from each 
other anatomically and mechanistically. Further, within a given human population 
and within the context of even a single experiment no two hippocampi or basal 
ganglia are alike—they vary in terms of a number of structural and constitutive 
details (e.g., overall shape of brain area, cell number, numbers of synaptic connec-
1 I am using this condition that Craver puts forward in his 2002 paper as a heuristic because I think 
it gets something right about how some neuroscientists conceive of double dissociation experi-
ments and what can be accomplished by using them.
9 Long-Term Potentiation: One Kind or Many?
jsulli29@uwo.ca
130
tions, intracellular and extracellular molecular concentrations). Variations in behav-
ioral performance and gross brain activity (e.g., BOLD signal) across subjects are 
also common in experiments in cognitive neuroscience.
The aforementioned differences could all be taken, from the perspective of an 
investigator, to correspond to different joints of nature. However, from the perspec-
tive of scientists, to acknowledge such differences as relevant for building a scien-
tific classification system would result in an unwieldy taxonomy of kinds that would 
contain as many different kinds as there are different individuals (either animals or 
humans). This would make the taxonomy wildly intractable and bar the kind of 
generality that neuroscientists desire for their explanations. Investigators must 
instead strike a delicate balance between “characterizing [a] mechanism very 
abstractly”, which “potentially glosses over sub-kinds of mechanism” and “charac-
terizing [a] mechanism in maximal detail”, which “threatens to make each particu-
lar mechanism a kind unto itself” (Craver 2009, 587; See also Craver 2014).
Striking such a balance is, in fact, what cognitive neuroscientists may be charac-
terized as doing. The taxonomic division between procedural and declarative mem-
ory abstracts away from certain differences while acknowledging others. The upshot 
is that rather than adhering strictly to developing taxonomies to directly mirror the 
causal structure of the world, “judgments about whether two mechanisms are mech-
anisms of the same kind rely ineliminably on judgments by people (in concert) 
about the appropriate degree of abstraction required for the problem at hand” 
(Craver 2014, 589). In other words, depending upon what the aims of inquiry are, 
be they explanation, prediction or intervention, the way investigators carve up the 
world will be aligned with their goals.
Even if we acknowledge, as Craver does, that conventional factors play a role in 
the development of our scientific taxonomies, this does not mean that investigators 
in neuroscience are not still aiming independently or collectively to discover some-
thing like or close enough (from their perspectives) to natural kinds. Craver seems 
sympathetic to this idea (See for example, Kendler et al. 2011). However, as I aim 
to show via an investigation of some relevant highlights of the 43-year history of 
LTP research, sometimes experimental practice is not conducive to the realization 
of this goal and investigators end up discovering kinds that are closer to the conven-
tional kinds (antirealist) rather than natural kinds (realist) end of the kinds contin-
uum (Craver 2009).
9.3  LTP: One Kind or Many?
Since at least the early twentieth century psychologists and physiologists hypothe-
sized that associative forms of learning required changes in how neurons communi-
cate with each other (See Kandel and Spencer 1968). In 1940, the psychologist 
Donald O. Hebb, proposed a mechanism for such changes. Hebb claimed that when 
two cells, A and B, which communicate across a synapse under normal conditions, 
undergo a period of repeated and concurrent activation, the result is a strengthening 
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of the connection between the two cells, exhibited by a subsequent change in the 
way cell A excites cell B (Hebb 1949). According to Hebb, each learning event is 
accompanied by a brief associated activation of two neurons that comprise a syn-
apse, which results in the memory of that event being stored in the form of a physi-
ological change at that synapse.
Although Hebb’s proposed mechanism for learning, as one among several 
“cellular- connection theories of learning” (Kandel and Spencer 1968, 68), had 
many supporters, during the 1950–1960s, investigators tried to produce activity- 
dependent Hebbian-like changes at several nervous system synapses (e.g., spinal 
cord, lateral geniculate nucleus) with limited success.2 In 1966, however, in the 
context of investigating the physiology of the dentate gyrus in the hippocampus of 
adult anesthetized rabbits, Terge Lømo observed an artificially induced physiologi-
cal equivalent of a strengthening in synaptic efficacy much like the one Hebb had 
described (See Lømo 2003). After applying a brief yet repetitive stimulation of 
“one-second bursts of high-frequency (100 Hz “tetanic”) stimulation” to perforant 
path fibers that project from the entorhinal cortex to the dentate gyrus, he recorded, 
extracellularly, an enduring observable increase in the amplitude above baseline of 
the evoked field potentials of post-synaptic dentate granule cells. This finding 
prompted him and his colleagues to further investigate the phenomenon (e.g., Bliss 
and Lømo 1973; Bliss and Gardner-Medwin 1973) and culminated in the publica-
tion of a now famous paper that introduced the scientific community to “a long- 
lasting potentiation of synaptic transmission” (Bliss and Lømo 1973)—the 
phenomenon later renamed “long-term potentiation” (LTP).
In order to produce LTP in the dentate area, Bliss and Lømo selected two loca-
tions in the hippocampus in which to place stimulating electrodes. One electrode 
was placed in the lateral perforant path and was used to deliver test pulses (0.1 msec, 
with maximum amplitude of 100 V) prior to LTP induction. The second electrode 
was placed in the medial perforant path and used to deliver LTP-inducing stimula-
tion. They selected two locations from which to record extracellularly: (1) the cell 
body layer, where they recorded population spikes and (2) the dendritic layer, from 
which they recorded excitatory post-synaptic potentials. Once the stimulating and 
recording electrodes were at their desired locations in the brain, they applied test 
pulses consisting of “single shocks at a fixed strength, repeated at intervals of 2–3 
sec[onds]” (Bliss and Lømo 1973, 334). Responses were recorded at regular inter-
vals for up to 30 min, “with average responses based on 20 or 30 consecutive single 
responses” (Bliss and Lømo 1973, 334). A “sequence of conditioning trains” was 
then delivered at “intervals of 30 min or more”. In each experiment they applied 
2 Little work had been done to study cortical synaptic plasticity in the mammalian brain due in part 
to technological limitations (Kandel and Spencer 1968, 85–86). However, quite a bit of work had 
been undertaken to induce changes in synaptic efficacy in the invertebrate, Aplysia depilans 
(Kandel and Spencer 1968). Early work on Aplysia indicated that activity-dependent changes in 
synaptic strength primarily involved pre-synaptic (e.g., changes in neurotransmitter release) as 
opposed to post-synaptic mechanisms (Kandel and Spencer 1968; See also Sweatt 2016).
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“one or more conditioning trains” with the trains delivered at “10–20/sec[onds] for 
10–15 sec[onds] or at 100/sec[ond] for 3–4 sec[onds]” (Bliss and Lømo 1973, 331).
Bliss and Lømo investigated several parameters of dentate granule cell responses, 
which they measured, following application of LTP-inducing conditioning trains to 
perforant path fibers: (1) changes in the amplitude of the population EPSP above 
average baseline response to test pulses; (2) changes in the peak of the amplitude of 
the population spike above baseline response to test pulses; and (3) latency of the 
population spike from post-conditioning test pulses to initial peak of the population 
spike. Across 15 experiments, they determined that “all three parameters were 
potentiated in 29% of the experiments” (1973, 331) they conducted. As evidence 
that they had detected a bona fide potentiation, they pointed to the fact that (1) the 
amplitude of the population EPSP increased in 43% of all experiments, (2) the pop-
ulation spike increased in 40% of all experiments and (3) a reduction in latency of 
the population spike occurred in 57% of all experiments. Their interpretation of the 
results was that “two independent mechanisms [were] responsible for [the] long- 
lasting potentiation” that they observed, namely: “(a) an increase in the efficiency of 
synaptic transmission at the perforant path synapses” and “(b) an increase in the 
excitability of the granule cell population” (1973, 332).
Immediately on the heels of Bliss and Lømo’s discovery, other investigators 
began producing LTP in their laboratories. The number of publications directed at 
understanding the phenomenon and its mechanisms exceeded 3000 by 1999 and 
6000 by 2004 (See Sweatt 2016). Before considering some of the details of LTP 
research during this historical timeframe that is relevant to the question of what kind 
of kind LTP is, it is relevant to first identify some general features of LTP experi-
ments and relate them to the concepts of natural and conventional kinds described 
in the previous section.
Experimentation consists of two stages (a) data production and (b) data interpre-
tation (e.g., Woodward 2003). In LTP experiments, data production may be further 
subdivided into two stages: (1) a design stage in which an experiment is designed 
and a stimulation paradigm and subprotocol for producing LTP are selected and (2) 
an implementation stage in which the experimental design is carefully instantiated 
across each individual experiment. The immediate output of each individual experi-
ment (or implementation of the experimental design) is an individual data point or 
set of data points. Investigators appeal to these data in order to adjudicate among 
competing hypotheses about LTP (e.g., hypotheses about its phenomenological fea-
tures, its synaptic and cellular and molecular mechanisms) (See Sullivan 2009).
As was mentioned above, in the early stages of developing a scientific taxonomy, 
investigators group together kinds of phenomena that they take to be similar in 
terms of observable features. Taxonomies are subsequently revised in response to 
discoveries pertaining to the mechanisms productive of those phenomena. Thinking 
about the aforementioned features of LTP experiments provides additional insights 
into the processes that contribute to stabilizing scientific taxonomies and the phe-
nomena to which they correspond. Bliss and Lømo selected an experimental design 
and sub-protocol for producing LTP. Insofar as across their individual experiments 
they adhered tightly to this experimental design, they took themselves to be 
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 producing, measuring and detecting the same phenomenon across all of the experi-
ments that had identical protocols they undertook in the laboratory. In doing so, they 
abstracted away from certain differences across these different experiments—dif-
ferent experimental subjects (e.g., rabbits, rats), different times of day in which the 
experiments were conducted, different stimulating and recording electrodes, differ-
ent hippocampi, different perforant paths, different granule cells. Insofar as they 
regarded the data production processes across all of these experiments as reliable, 
they took themselves to be warranted in grouping the effects produced as instances 
of the same phenomenon.
Yet, were Bliss and Lømo warranted in grouping the effects produced across 
their different LTP experiments as instances of the same kind of phenomenon? I 
think our intuition is to respond “yes” to this question in part because we assume 
that just so long as the experimental process across these different experiments was 
reliable, then the mechanisms productive of the effects produced across them were 
sufficiently identical to be able to warrant classifying them as the same phenomenon 
(See Feest 2011 on the conditions under which phenomena are stabilized). When 
scientists make such judgments, they appear to be applying something like the NDR 
criterion; insofar as they think that the mechanisms across each experiment are 
identical or conserved, there are no grounds for splitting LTP into as many different 
kinds as there are LTP experiments. In other words, the scientists regard such 
abstractions away from the specific details of these experiments as legitimate just so 
long as they have good grounds for believing that the measures they have taken 
across experiments do serve to track or preserve real differences. Even though it is 
clear that conventional factors (i.e., decisions on the part of two investigators as to 
how to produce, detect and measure the phenomenon) are playing a role in shaping 
the kinds of phenomena discovered, there seems to be some sense in which the dif-
ferent instances grouped together constitute a bona fide kind of phenomenon from 
the perspective of the investigator(s).
What happens, however, when we consider LTP research taking place after the 
publication of Bliss and Lømo’s 1973 paper? Immediately on the heels of their dis-
covery, other neurophysiologists began producing what they regarded as forms of 
mammalian LTP in their laboratories. Bliss and Gardner-Medwin, for example, 
went on to demonstrate that same year that “the same phenomenon” could be pro-
duced “without anaesthesia and under normal more stable conditions which can be 
obtained using chronically prepared animals” (1973, 358). Robert Douglas and 
Graham Goddard sought to “repeat the observations of Bliss and Gardner-Medwin 
using the rat instead of the rabbit” but made “several modifications to the proce-
dure” in order to “make the observed potentiation more reliable” (1975, 206). By 
1975, other neurophysiologists were producing LTP in their labs, using in vitro 
brain slice preparations (e.g., Deadwyler et al. 1975) and other novel electrophysi-
ological recording techniques, including patch clamp (See Sweatt 2016). By 1976, 
in vitro experiments had been used to produce LTP in three subregions of the hip-
pocampus (CA1, CA3 and dentate gyrus), and “the time course of appearance, mag-
nitude of the effect and duration of LTP appear[ed] to be similar in all 3 areas” 
(Alger and Teyler 1976, 469). In 1976, Gary Lynch, V. Gribkoff and S. Deadwyler 
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published a letter to the journal Nature indicating that “hippocampal synapses” dis-
played “an unusual degree of physiological plasticity” and that the findings that 
“modest levels of repeated stimulation cause considerable enhancement in subse-
quent responses to single pulse stimulation” had “been replicated in several labora-
tories” (1976, 151).3
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, the LTP field exploded exponentially. By 
1979, LTP at hippocampal synapses had become a model for understanding LTP in 
the nervous system more broadly and a lot of work was already being directed at 
uncovering the biochemical processes (e.g., second-messenger signaling cascades) 
and neurotransmitters (e.g., glutamate) involved in LTP at hippocampal synapses 
(e.g., Browning et al. 1979; Lynch et al.1979; Dunwiddie and Lynch 1978; Baudry 
and Lynch 1980; Dolphin et al. 1982, 287). Different investigators used different 
stimulation paradigms and subprotocols, some that were intended to mimic “natu-
rally occurring firing patterns, observed in vivo in the hippocampus” (e.g., theta- 
burst stimulation) and others that were used to induce LTP “by pairing repeated, 
single presynaptic stimuli with postsynaptic membrane depolarization” (“so-called 
‘pairing’ LTP”) (Sweatt 2016).
I want to assume, for the sake of argument that investigators who engaged in this 
early LTP research regarded the instances of LTP they were producing in their own 
laboratories as bona fide instances of LTP, much like Bliss and Lomo did, and for 
similar reasons. That is, with respect to each published research study, just so long 
as investigators had ensured the reliability of their LTP-producing experiments, they 
believed themselves justified in thinking that they had stabilized a single kind of 
phenomenon in their own laboratories. However, if we compare and contrast differ-
ent features of these experiments—different experimental subjects (rabbits, rats, 
guinea pigs), different stimulation paradigms and protocols for producing LTP, dif-
ferent preparations (in vitro, in vivo), different time course with respect to how long 
the potentiated effect lasted, it becomes difficult to assess whether all of these sepa-
rate laboratory effects are instances of the same phenomenon or different phenom-
ena. Are the mechanisms across experiments that use different model organisms, 
different hippocampal synapses or different stimulation paradigms and protocols or 
different preparations all the same?
In the 1970s and 1980s, investigators did not have answers to these questions.4 
Not enough was known about the cellular and molecular mechanisms of LTP, nor 
whether cellular and molecular activity differed depending upon the organisms 
being investigated or stimulus parameters and preparations being used. In response 
to such uncertainties, some investigators qualified the kind of LTP they were inves-
tigating by pointing to differences in the stimulation paradigms, animals and 
 preparations used (in vivo, in vitro), and/or the synapses at which LTP-inducing 
3 The general claim that persisted in the literature until 1986 was that “long-term potentiation [. . .] 
seen in several hippocampal pathways following repetitive stimulation, [was] somewhat unique 
when compared to the post-tetanic potentiation seen at the neuromuscular junction or in inverte-
brates” (Dunwiddie and Lynch 1978, 353–354) in so far that it was longer lasting.
4 They still lack answers, as I explain later in this section.
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stimuli had been delivered.5 Other investigators, at least prior to 1986, seemed ame-
nable to the idea that despite these kinds of differences, the same phenomenon was 
under study at least across all hippocampal LTP experiments (e.g., Dunwiddie, 
Madison and Lynch 1978; Lynch et al. 1979). In other words, there was no real 
consensus as to how to “lump” or “split” the phenomena. Given that LTP research 
was, from 1973–1988, in what some reviewers later characterized as “a descriptive 
phase” (See for e.g., Nicoll, Kauer and Malenka 1988, 97)—a phase in which little 
was being learned about the mechanisms of LTP—this general lack of consensus 
about how to “lump” or “split” the phenomena makes sense (See also Craver 2003).
By 1988, LTP research had entered “a mechanistic phase” and results from a 
series of experiments that involved blockade of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) 
receptors at different LTP synapses were taken to establish that LTP at mossy fiber 
synapses did not require activation of NMDA-receptors (e.g, Harris and Cotman 
1986; Staubli 1992).6 This prompted investigators to split the category of hippocam-
pal LTP into two broad subcategories: NMDA-receptor dependent and NMDA- 
receptor independent LTP (See also Nicoll et al. 1988; Nicoll and Malenka 1995). 
Notice that this suggests that there is some sense in which neurobiologists were 
upholding something like the NDR criterion—given the discovery that LTP could 
be produced with and without NMDA receptor activation, the hippocampal LTP 
category was split.
By 1994, investigators had begun to acknowledge that LTP could be induced in 
many different synaptic pathways by a variety of induction paradigms, and that the 
biochemical mechanisms of these forms of LTP may differ (See Malenka 1994; See 
also Lisman et al. 2003). Despite such admissions, some investigators still grouped 
results from different experiments together in order to make general claims about 
specific forms of LTP. For example, in 1999, Robert Malenka and Roger Nicoll 
found it necessary to restrict the focus of their review to LTP induced at “synapses 
between the Schaffer collateral and commissural axons and the apical dendrites of 
CA1 pyramidal cells” (1999, 1870). They also acknowledged that because “a review 
of the literature generates an enormous, even bewildering, list of candidate signal 
5 Bliss and Gardner-Medwin, for example, acknowledged, “the mechanisms of the effect remain 
uncertain” (Bliss and Gardner-Medwin 1973, 373). Douglas and Goddard were careful to indicate, 
“this type of potentiation may underlie memory storage in one part of the mammalian brain”5 
(1975, 214) rather than at all mammalian cortical synapses. While some investigators regarded 
“intracellular recordings from in vitro preparations of both immature and mature hippocampal tis-
sue” as “similar to those obtained in vivo” (Deadwyler et al. 1975, 80), one early failure to obtain 
LTP in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus was attributed to the possibility that in vitro slice 
preparations could compromise the integrity of the synaptic pathways (Deadwyler et al., 1975, 84) 
and result in a “decreased amount of recurring excitation” compared to in vivo preparations (Alger 
and Teyler 1976, 478). By 1978, Dunwiddie and Lynch determined that “various conditioning 
frequencies apparently induce[d] different degrees of long-term potentiation” (Dunwiddie and 
Lynch 1978, 366) and that synaptic transmission was required for the initiation of LTP (Dunwiddie, 
Madison & Lynch 413).
6 Ursula Staubli, for example, claimed “mossy fiber potentiation is unlike LTP both in induction 
and expression mechanisms and thus is a wholly different form of synaptic plasticity” (Staubli 
1992, 151).
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transduction molecules” involved in LTP at these synapses, they were focusing only 
on those results concerning the mechanisms of this form of LTP that they took to be 
“compelling” (1999, 1871). By 2003, concerns about whether the mechanisms of 
different forms of NMDA-receptor dependent LTP (alone) differed depending upon 
the LTP stimulation paradigms and protocols used were prevalent in the LTP com-
munity. Specifically, Robert Malenka pointed to what was then becoming “the 
increasingly popular hypothesis that different LTP induction protocols result in 
mechanistically distinct types of NMDA receptor-dependent LTP”, which was 
“often used as a polite explanation for discrepancy in results between [research] 
groups”. Although Malenka suggested that “the evidence in support of this idea 
remain[ed] weak”; he acknowledged that “it will remain important to seriously con-
sider the possibility that the patterns of activity that are used to elicit LTP influence 
which intracellular signalling cascades are activated” (Malenka 2003, 925). The 
following year, Malenka and Mark Bear indicated that “when discussing LTP […] 
it is now necessary to define at which specific synapses these phenomena are being 
studied, at what time point during development, and how they are being triggered 
(Malenka and Bear 2004, 5). As partial indication that such issues have not yet been 
fully resolved, Baudry and colleagues recently claimed, “as has been repeatedly 
mentioned, a major difficulty to integrate all the findings” about LTP “is due in part 
to the use of different experimental protocols by the majority of research laborato-
ries working on this topic, and the apparent lack of reproducibility of experimental 
data resulting from these differences” (2015, 74).
Given even these spotty details of the history of LTP, an interesting picture 
emerges with respect to the kinds of constraints that have to date informed the 
development of a taxonomy (or lack thereof) of LTP. Over the course of a 43-year 
history, the published record included well over 6000 papers on LTP. If investigators 
had begun to treat each independent instance of LTP produced in a given laboratory 
as an independent phenomenon having an independent mechanism, they would 
have risked having to develop an unwieldy taxonomy containing as many different 
kinds of LTP as there were experiments for producing it. That clearly was not practi-
cal. So, researchers instead (at least in the context of review papers) abstracted away 
from specific details of experimental practice that may have led to differences in 
mechanisms in order to make the goal of providing a unified model of LTP or uni-
fied models of specific forms of LTP (e.g. hippocampal NMDA-receptor LTP in 
area CA1 tractable). Phenomena that may indeed have been produced by different 
mechanisms thus were sometimes treated as instances of the same phenomenon.
However, notice that by treating different instances of LTP that may have had 
different mechanisms as all the same phenomenon, researchers abstracted away 
from potentially relevant causal differences, which seems antithetical to the discov-
ery of kinds that track real divisions in the causal structure of the world.7
7 At the time of Bliss and Lomo’s discovery, LTP had been reliably produced in invertebrates across 
many different laboratories. Bliss and Lomo’s finding was different, because it was produced in the 
mammalian brain. Debates about whether the cellular and mechanisms for LTP induction were 
conserved across species persisted well into the 21st century (See for example Bickle 2006). It was 
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That such pragmatic factors were operative in the development of the LTP tax-
onomy remained hidden until recently, when more and more investigators began to 
reach consensus that maybe the forms of even hippocampal area CA1 LTP being 
produced in different laboratories were really different as opposed to the same phe-
nomenon. The reason that they remained hidden, in part, is that there were discover-
ies, like the discovery of non-NMDA-receptor-dependent LTP that seemed to 
confirm the idea that LTP researchers were in search of natural kinds and inclined to 
uphold the NDR criterion. However, as I have demonstrated in this section, a closer 
look at LTP research reveals that pragmatic factors have played a prominent role in 
shaping the current taxonomy of LTP.
9.4  Conclusion
At the start of this chapter, I raised four questions to which I want to return in light 
of the aforementioned analysis. First, do LTP researchers take different instances of 
LTP produced across different experimental protocols to be the same kind of phe-
nomenon or different phenomena? I think there is widespread recognition that these 
different instances may not be the same phenomenon and that there is no real con-
sensus about how to “lump” or “split” the phenomena. To cope with the vastness of 
the experimental record on LTP, some researchers have abstracted away from differ-
ences in experimental protocols in an attempt to provide unified mechanistic models 
of this or that specific form of LTP (e.g., Malenka and Nicoll 1999; Baudry et al. 
2015). So, what kind of kinds are LTP researchers are aiming to discover? From one 
perspective it may indeed be accurate to say that investigators are interested in dis-
covering the mechanisms of LTP and developing a taxonomy that corresponds to 
real divisions in kinds of LTP. However, the multiplicity of experimental protocols, 
combined with the fact that discovering mechanisms is a collaborative enterprise 
are factors that have contributed to neurobiologists having to make pragmatic deci-
sions as to how to lump or split the phenomena.
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common to hear some investigators arguing that LTP involved pre-synaptic mechanisms and others 
that it involved post- synaptic mechanisms. Support for conservation of mechanisms waxed and 
waned depending on the grain of analysis one used to assess similarities and differences in mecha-
nisms across organisms (See Bechtel and Mundale 1999, Sullivan 2009; Craver 2009).
9 Long-Term Potentiation: One Kind or Many?
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